66 CC Tutorials

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VizOne

Verfied Vendor
Mar 31, 2016
452
20
18
25
/system/system32/system.exe
#1
So, all it about games and game stuff.
1. MMORPG-Store's AntiFraud & Defence System. So elementary ways of such shops protection are: - IP-address must be from the same state, better – city; - Area code in entered phone must be from the same state; - You’ll be invited to live chat and asked for some questions; - If you’re looking nor trusted in first three steps, may be call requested;
2. About games themselves. You should know that many of game-masters don’t like that game currencies are selling for real money. So be ready that in one beautiful day you can see message like “Your account is banned. Reason is hacker, scammer, fraudulent etc”. So you’re under the risk when you save on account at the age of a week big amounts of game currencies. So don’t be lazy and enter periodically on the account and make visibility that you’re real gamer and you like to play. And don’t forget that if you card the currencies – there could be chargeback. And of course after it your accout will e blocked anyway.
3. What you need for work. - good proxy-service of course with enough value of socks4/5 located in needed states/cities; - credit card or better paypal or more better more than one paypal – needed to be explained? I think not; - e-mail. It’s better don’t use e-mails like 238jerom32 @verifiedcarder.ws. Don’t be lazy to search for some nicer addresses: something like MMORPG-KING @INORBIT.COM или SPACEWARRIOR @GAMER.LA (easy.la – hundreds of free domains) или LINEAGEFUN @WINNING.COM.
4. About shops and their owners. Most of popular MMORPG supermarkets belong to small yellow-skin people with proud of that there are 1 000 000 000 of such people on the Earth. Second place take Americans and the third place take nobody but it’s possible to put there people from ex-USSR. And what interesting that last people don’t like to serve people from their countries and they mainly targeted on USA and EU customers.
So that’s the list of things you will need: a. Socks-service. Almost everyone knows where to find it. b. VPN with good encryption. c. Software: - Permeo Security Driver, Socks Chain, FreeCAP and Other Analog - Soft which changes OS Language,OS Regional Settings & Time Zone,Date. Browser Type & Language. - Trusted track-eracer removing all info without recovering possible: CyberScrub,Ashampoo ,TICEraser,ACRONIS Privacy Suite and other analog) d. AIM Messenger,Yahoo Messenger for possible contact with shop’s support.
 

VizOne

Verfied Vendor
Mar 31, 2016
452
20
18
25
/system/system32/system.exe
#2
All About cashing
In this article I would like to point out some of the working at the present time means of making money and laundering the earnings.
First of all what could you make money on? There are a many topics written that newbie can read, although most of the schemes described are non-working or very difficult to realize. The main schemes are:
- Adult - Casino / Totalizator - Auctions
Basically, many articles were written about it. In this article I am going to sum up the schemes and talk about the last stage of carding - what to do with those sums that you managed to make using ways mentioned above, to be exact v how to get cold hard cash in the palm of your hand.
Let's start with auctions.
I will not be talking about making sellers accounts or where to get them - I personally do not sell them so if you are interested in that, search the forum. I will only talk about several characteristics of working with accounts - i.e. what exactly you should do in order for the funds to reach the person that will turn them into cash and eventually get the cash to you.
The first, and important factor of success is the amount of positive feedbacks (responses) on seller-s account, which is the one you-ll be using. When the person searches through the auctions for the merchandize to purchase he pays attention to sellers feedbacks or the lack there of. More feedbacks translate into more trust from your potential buyer.
Do not overlook that after the winner is determined on your lot, you will have to communicate with the buyer by the means of e-mail, therefore you will need to use good English v otherwise the unnecessary suspicions might come into play.
On well-known online auction site eBay there is a list of some goods that are not allowed to be put up for the auction, as for the rest, anything goes from socks up to washing machines.
Now about cashing. The most effective way of getting money out of the auctions - are and always were checks. More precisely, not just any checks, but Money Orders and Cashier Checks. I will explain why:
- Why not wire transfer? The account used for wire will have a really short life span, nervous buyers have a habit of checking when and where did their money go. Keep in mind that they will not wait for too long so you are risking that the deal will go sour in the very end and you will not be able to collect.
- Why not Personal Check? Because, after sending personal check to your drop, the buyer and authorities can easily track and subsequently stop the payment. Same applies to different escrow services like BidPay.
- Money Orders and Cashier Checks v are not checks payable to a named person, but those that you can buy at your local post office or the bank. Those only contain personal information if the buyer decided to put it there. Postal Money Orders, in particular are impossible to stop payment on.
So now we-ve discussed the best ways of getting the money out of the auctions. Keep in mind one nuance: try to ?work? on the buyer who has won your auction so that he stays calm as long as possible about the validity of the deal. It-s in your interests: The longer your buyer remains assured of receiving the merchandize, the longer your drop that receives checks lives, and therefore you?ll be able to make more money.
One more thing that is also very important to keep in mind: Make sure that the buyer is physically as far away as possible from your drop - quite often there are such heroes that come to the address where they sent the check, demanding their goods or money.
Now we shall proceed to on-line gambling and making money on that.
Everyone is familiar with the basic technique. The majority of schemes that are connected in one way or the other with working in casinos are discussed on the CarderPlanet. I will talk only about some aspects concerned with the final (the most important and crucial) stage - with cashing.
After a massive attack of carders on a casino that were processed by MicroGaming (MG), they have ceased to send prizes on ACH as this kind of money transfer meant the name of the owner on the account assigned is not checked. That basically means, the casinos from MG are hardly interesting anymore, because the money withdrawal process has gotten to be quite complicated.
So v does that mean that casino theme has died? Not at all v There are other casinos that are served by different processing companies - for example, EFS. If you dedicate some time on searching the net you are sure to find something
Before working with any casino make sure not to overlook reading their policies. Find out ways of a withdrawal.
After the certain sum of money was won, the initial deposit must be returned on a card. That assures that no one get nervous neither the card owner nor a casino. And everyone, including you, will remain pleased.
Further all is clear - go to reliable cashier for drop or the account, agree about interest and send transfer or the check - depending on a method that this casino uses.
Further - adult (porn-sites).
I?d like to emphasize yet again that quite a lot was written and discussed on this subject. Don-t be lazy and look in archives. A huge amount of information!
Briefly:
1. Create a site or order one from good web designer whom you-ll find on the Planet. A well-made, professional site will improve your odds.
2. Fill it with the content.
3. Connect to billing of your choice that pays often.
4. Make or buy traffic and start to input the card numbers.

During this process pay special attention to changing your proxy servers. Each new card must be linked to a different e-mail address. Do not overlook your system setting especially the language.
On the present day (July, 13, 2002), these are the main schemes in carding that are connected with cashing. There is also a merchandize carding, working with your own merchants, and working with real plastic - but these subjects demand considerable experience so I would not advise beginners to start with them, nor they are connected with cashing, nuances of which were discussed in this article.
And, in conclusion, little about cashing and cashiers.
Work only with professional and well-checked cashiers. Ideal choice - verified people. The beginner or not a well-known cashier, even though he might not be a fake, can simple lack professionalism in this subject (and believe me - in the work of cashier there is such heap of hidden dangers!)
 

VizOne

Verfied Vendor
Mar 31, 2016
452
20
18
25
/system/system32/system.exe
#3
Antifraud systems working
In all online shops which accept credit card was added "Credit Card Fraud Detection service" (further CCFDs). It's task is to percent of possibility of fraud. It counts as named fraud score (FS) based on main factors of legity. For example if FS higher than 2,5 it's adviced to manager to hold order or claim a call.
Factors of fraud:
1. E-mail Domain - they look provider of your e-mail (if it's free email provider like hotmail.com)
2. Geographic Source-IP A country which IP belongs to and a country you're entering in the shop must be the same.
3. Anonymous Proxy - if IP of customer in black list.
4 High Risk Country - for example Russia, Ukrain, Moldova, Belorussia, Columbia, Egypt, Indonesia, Livan, Macedonia
5. Distance-Расстояние - distance between IP location and shipping address.
6. Bin Number Match - country of bank emited the card and country of IP (check by BIN).
9-Carder E-mail - if entered e-mail is in database of famous carders.
10-Open Proxy - check IP on public proxy
11-Spam - checking IP in spam blacklist
And that's the formula for counting FS:

FS = 2.5 * isFreeEmail + 2.5 * countryDoesntMatch + 5 * highRiskCountry + 10 * min(distance,5000) / maxEarthArc + 2 * binDoesntMatch + 5 * carderEmail + 2.5 * proxyScore + spamScore/3 maxEarth = 20037.
 

VizOne

Verfied Vendor
Mar 31, 2016
452
20
18
25
/system/system32/system.exe
#4
Applied Cryptography for Magnetic Stripe cards
1.0 Introduction
The intention of this document is to provide a basic understanding of cryptography and techniques applied to magnetic stripe cards in the financial industry.
This subject is normally approached with some trepidation by the uninitiated, however it is reasonably straightforward once the basic principles are explained.
Cryptography is complex, but its practical application is less so. It is not necessary to understand the mathematics involved in order to successfully use and manage cryptography in a financial environment.
Because of the security implications of card cryptography, it is extremely hard to find information in any form explaining this application, which adds to the somewhat unnecessary shroud of mystery surrounding the topic. In early implementations, a measure of additional security was provided by ensuring that few people knew exactly how these mechanisms worked and this method of operation has permeated into today?s implementations.
However, none of the information provided in this document will compromise security in any way.
Although other, more secure card tokens are becoming available, the magnetic stripe card is significantly cheaper than alternatives, and is by far the most common card type in use. Security techniques for magnetic cards have slowly but steadily improved, and properly implemented can provide perfectly adequate security for financial transactions in a very cost-effective manner.
2.0 Use of cryptography in financial magnetic stripe cards
The most commonly known use of cryptography is in the provision of a Personal Identification Number, or PIN, to allow a magnetic stripe card to be used in unattended environments such as ATM?s, or in other situations where traditional signature checking is inappropriate. This applies equally to credit, debit and ATM cards. There are not many financial cards in use today that do not have some kind of PIN capability.
A second common use of cryptography is in providing anti-counterfeit mechanisms for the magnetic stripe. The intention is to prevent fraudulent construction of counterfeit cards by inserting a value on the magnetic stripe that cannot be derived from other card information. Thus when a card is Verified online this value can be checked to determine whether the card is genuine or a forgery. Several different standards exist for this mechanism, the most common being the VISA Card Verification Value (CVV) or the Mastercard equivalent, CVC. For the purposes of this document I will refer to this mechanism as CVV as this is the term in most common use.
Other uses of cryptography do not directly relate to the card, they generally relate to the encryption of PIN?s and messages whilst being transmitted in a financial environment to prevent their disclosure or alteration.
These items will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections.
3.0 Basic Cryptography
A basic understanding of cryptographic techniques is required in order to understand this document.
The majority of magnetic card encryption is based on the Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA), usually called DES or Data Encryption Standard. The idea behind DES is that a clear value is passed to the DES algorithm, which can be implemented either as software routines or in dedicated hardware. DES then encrypts the clear value using a key (a secret 64-bit value) and outputs an encrypted value.
The unencrypted input is usually referred to as Cleartext, while the encrypted result is referred to as Ciphertext. The operation that turns cleartext into ciphertext is known in DES terms as an ?encipher? operation. Figure 1 - DES Encipher operation
Note the following:
The DES algorithm is NOT secret. It is publicly available. The Key, however, is secret.
This process is reversible. Executing a DES ?decipher? function using the same key will convert the ciphertext into cleartext.
A value encrypted with a key is generally referred to as being encrypted ?under? that key.
The security and integrity of the whole operation depends on the secrecy of the key used. The key is a random value that is strictly protected and never disclosed or written down. Most of the complexity involved in DES cryptography systems is related to protecting, storing and transmitting keys, and these activities are referred to as key management.
Note also that the DES encipher operation as described above is not foolproof. In theory, a massively parallel processor could derive the key in about a days processing. Much is made of this possibility in discussions on strengthening security, however, additional procedures can be implemented which go some way towards reducing the effect of this limitation.
If we take a simple example to demonstrate this: computer logon passwords.
Passwords used on computer systems are commonly encrypted after they have been set, and they are stored in a file in encrypted format. When a user signs on, the password is entered, usually in a hidden field, in cleartext. It is important to understand that this value is NOT compared against a value that is deciphered from the password file. The cleartext password in enciphered under the same key and compared against the enciphered value stored on the password file. Cleartext, enciphered under the same key, will always provide the same result, and almost all cryptographic validation compares ciphertext to ciphertext to avoid exposing cleartext values inside computer systems that could be compromised by memory dumps and so on.
Figure 2 - Password encryption
In this scenario however, a user of a password can always claim that his password can be exposed by deciphering the enciphered value, and that this is not under his control - and this is true.
Dynamic key exchange
Many financial systems implement dynamic key exchange. While not exclusively relating to magnetic stripe cards, it is relevant to include it here.
In dynamic key exchange, two parties change keys ?on the fly? to ensure that one key is not used for an extended period and risks exposure. This is normally used in the financial environment where two hosts are exchanging financial authorisation messages - for example an acquirer bank and an issuer bank. When the acquirer bank forwards the PIN to the issuer bank for validation, it must do so encrypted to avoid
disclosure. Obviously, the issuer will need access to the key used to encrypt the PIN so that it may be deciphered for validation. These keys will have been previously agreed, and may be changed using dynamic key exchange where keys are shipped (themselves enciphered under a ?key encryption key?) and changed frequently in real time for added security.
It must be stressed that no cryptography system is ever completely secure. There are always weaknesses in any system, both from a technical viewpoint and operationally, where human and operational procedures may be compromised.
4.0 Practical application of cryptography in Magnetic stripe cards.
The intention of this section is to demonstrate how cryptographic principles are (usually) applied to magnetic stripe cards in a practical context.
4.1 PIN Processing
The PIN principle is based on the fact that nobody other than the legitimate cardholder has knowledge of the PIN. Thus when a PIN is provided for a customer:
It must not be stored anywhere in cleartext (except in the secure PIN mailer destined for the customer)
It must not be possible to reverse-engineer the PIN from information on the magnetic stripe or from a centrally held database.
Normally, a PIN is a 4-digit numeric value. Other schemes exist, but we will use this format for illustration as it is a common standard.
When a PIN is issued, the sequence of events is as follows:
A 4-digit random number is generated. This is the PIN.
The PIN is combined with other information, such as the account number, to create a block of data for input to the cryptography process.
The input block is triple encrypted using the PIN working keys
Digits are selected from the ciphertext result. These become the Pin Verification Value or Pin Offset.

The PIN Offset is stored
The PIN mailer is printed
Memory is cleared to binary zeroes to remove all traces of the clear PIN.
At this point, the only place the PIN value exists is inside the PIN mailer. The PIN cannot be derived from the PIN offset.
When the card is used and the PIN entered, the PIN offset is calculated again from the entered PIN, using the PIN working keys and compared to the stored offset value to determine if the correct PIN was entered. Clearly this means that when a PIN is Verified, the validating system must have access to the PIN working keys used during initial PIN issue or subsequent PIN change.
It should be re-emphasised that the offset comprises selected digits from the ciphertext. Typically this would be 4-6 digits. It is not possible to recreate the keys or derive the PIN from this value.
Notes:
I.In some implementations, the PIN offset is stored on the magnetic stripe on the card. This is intended to be used in terminals which can perform local PIN validation. However, this technique is becoming rare as it prevents deployment of user-selectable PIN?s.
II. Where the user is given the option to change PIN, the new offset is calculated in realtime and written to the database. Note that if the PIN is forgotten, it cannot be recreated.
III. The method described above is generic. There are many variations, such as the IBM3624 Method-A, Diebold method, and so on, however the principle remains the same.
IV. In many methods, the framework exists for using different key pairs based on an index value, usually stored on the magnetic stripe. This is a single digit value denoting the index of the key pair to be used. The intent is so that a) the same keys are not used across the entire cardbase, and c) that new keys can be used on re-issue without affecting existing cards.
4.2 CVV processing
It was quickly understood that the proliferation of financial cards exposed institutions to risk from counterfeiters. In the credit card world, this came from manufacture of cards with or without magnetic stripe encoding that possessed valid numbers and seemingly valid names and logos. In the ATM card arena, attackers observed PIN number entry ?over the shoulder?, collated these PIN?s with information from discarded receipts and so on, and constructed their own magnetic stripes on dummy cards for use at their leisure with observed PIN numbers.
These threats and others led to the introduction of the Card Verification Value, a non-derivable sequence of digits constructed by cryptographic process and written to the magnetic stripe of the card. This means that electronic capture of transactions (either at ATM or Point of Sale) are effectively protected against counterfeiters.
A combination of static data such as account number is triple encrypted using a special Card Verification key pair. Selected digits from the result are used to create the CVV, and this is written onto the magnetic stripe.
Similar comments apply to CVV as those for Pin Offset; As the CVV consists of few digits, and triple encryption is used, the CVV keys and values are highly secure and presence of a valid CVV provides an added level of confidence that the card is not counterfeit.
It should be noted that CVV is simply an additional protection method; it is not foolproof. It does not, for instance, protect against fraudulent captures of magnetic stripe data using, say, fake ATM?s.
A further development of CVV, CVV2, is used for telephone authorisations. A similar (although not identical) calculation is performed as for CVV, and selected digits from the result are physically printed on the back of the card. These digits can then be requested by a call centre wishing to determine if the caller is really in possession of the card. Once again, this is an additional check, and not foolproof.

4.3 Key management
Key management relates to the storage, protection and transmission of keys. A single financial installation will have many DES keys, and these require careful management if they are not to become compromised or confused. One of the worst forms of debugging of computer faults is when cryptography is involved as traces and dumps are meaningless, and it can be very hard to discover that the wrong cryptography keys are being used!
Keys are normally managed in hierarchies. Keys that are actually used for computation, such as PIN validation [working keys] are themselves stored in enciphered format under a key encryption key. Other
key sets will exist for transporting keys from one location to another, such as two nodes in a network. These are known as transport keys.
In good key management systems, working keys are never stored or exposed in clear format. Even when they are initially created, they are frequently created by automated process and never known to individuals.
When initial keys are created, the 64 bits are split between two or more individuals, who then toss a coin once for each bit required. The two or more individuals then key in their segment of the random key alone, and thus no one individual ever has sight of a whole key. This method is normally used for initial master key generation.
Although a simple concept, key management can become quite complex in implementation.
In a simple ATM network for instance, a terminal master key is used to encipher working keys in transit. A terminal master key (TMK) is generated for each terminal, split into two halves and printed (or sometimes encoded on a special magnetic card). Each TMK is then installed at their respective ATM?s. The host system will then download terminal working keys, enciphered under the respective terminal master key, to each ATM. The terminal working key is then used to encipher PIN data in transit to the host during normal processing. If required, the terminal working key can be changed at regular intervals or through dynamic key exchange - but this process requires careful management.
It should be noted that the biggest single security exposure to DES based cryptographic subsystems is in the exchange of keys, thus good key management procedures are paramount.

4.4 Physical implementation
Cryptographic processing and key management is normally performed in specialised, dedicated secure hardware. Although DES can be implemented entirely in software (using products such as IBM?s PCF), it is less secure, and the DES algorithm can be quite processor intensive.
There are companies that specialise in dedicated cryptographic units, such as Racal and Atalla. They are commonly called HSM?s (Host Security Module) although this is the Racal proprietary name for the unit.
When using these devices, the intent is that all encipher and decipher activity takes place in the secure unit, and that clear keys and cleartext values are never exposed outside the unit.
Physically, HSM?s are tamper proof and intended for installation in secure computer rooms. Attempts to open them will result in the destruction of keys contained in the devices.
HSM?s are also capable of generating new random keys and random numbers for use as PIN?s in a secure manner.
Some applications use physical telecommunications line encryption for added security, and there are a variety of manufacturers of this type of device. They are effectively ?black box? and require no special knowledge.

5.0 Examples
5.1 Cryptography in a normal ATM withdrawal Consider a common ATM transaction: A customer inserts his card in the ATM The customer enters his PIN The customer requests cash The transaction is approved, cash is dispensed There?s an awful lot of cryptography going on in this process. For simplicity, we?ll assume the acquiring
and issuing bank are the same.
The cryptography activity is identified in italics in the sequence:
1. A customer inserts his card in the ATM The magnetic stripe is read and stored in a buffer in the ATM
2. The customer enters his PIN The PIN is entered into a tamper-proof PIN pad The stored PIN is stored in a security module in hardware
3. The customer requests cash The message is constructed in the ATM The PIN (and possibly more) is enciphered under the Terminal key
The message is sent to the host, possibly enciphered in comms hardware.
On receipt at the host, the comms level encryption is deciphered The CVV is calculated and compared to the value on the magstripe The PIN under the Terminal key is deciphered The PIN offset or PVV is calculated The PIN offset or PVV is compared to the database of PVV?s
4. The transaction is approved, cash is dispensed
Note: all the host cryptography functions are normally performed in the Host Security module. No Cleartext values are exposed to application programs or outside the secure environment.
5.2 Cryptography in an EFTPoS transaction
Even in a signature authorised environment, the CVV from the magnetic stripe can be Verified at the host system to detect counterfeit cards. Clearly this only works in online environments as the CVV validation requires a cryptographic calculation to be performed at the host.
[Note: It is possible, and some manufacturers support, local key storage on EFTPoS devices and distributed terminals. Because of the key management complications, these devices are not considered here]
A more common use of cryptography in EFTPoS environments (and, increasingly in ATM and other traffic) is the MAC (Message Authentication Code). The MAC check can be thought of as a value calculated from the contents of all the critical fields in a message (such as card number and amount) and passed through a cryptographic algorithm. Although the message is carried over transmission lines in clear, the validation of the MAC field at the recipient will determine whether fields have been tampered with. [for the technically minded, MAC can be thought of as an encrypted LRC field]. The overhead of MAC is quite small. (The MAC is defined as 16 bytes in ISO8583).
5.3 Other financial cryptography applications
As well as traditional uses of cryptography as described above, interbank networks (such as SWIFT) have historically been large users of cryptographic techniques.
A plethora of new delivery mechanisms and far wider distribution of advanced technology to the public has increased both the interest in and the use of cryptographic techniques.
In cases where cryptography is required for widespread dissemination to the public (such as PC based home banking) ordinary DES is too complex to manage securely. More appropriate and more secure algorithms such as RSA (A ?public key? encryption system) have evolved and been deployed in these environments - they are outside the scope of this paper but review of public key algorithms is especially encouraged where appropriate.
Some corporate, EDI and treasury applications use highly secure DES with a combination of techniques - MAC, physical encryption, dynamic key exchange, smart card key storage and so on. In one implementation reviewed, the working key is changed every transaction by the result of a MAC key calculation residue (a so-called ?one time? key system).